The role of kinematic mental simulation in creating false memories by Iani', Francesco et al.
 The role of mental kinematic simulation in creating false memories 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
This is an author version of the contribution published on: 
Questa è la versione dell’autore dell’opera: 
 [Ianì, F., Mazzoni, G., & Bucciarelli, M., Journal of Cognitive Psychology, doi: 
10.1080/20445911.2018.1426588] 
 
The definitive version is available at: 
La versione definitiva è disponibile alla URL: 
[https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2018.1426588] 
 
 The role of mental kinematic simulation in creating false memories 
 
2 
 
The role of kinematic mental simulation in creating false memories 
 
Francesco Ianìa, Giuliana Mazzonib, & Monica Bucciarellia 
aDipartimento di Psicologia, Università di Torino 
Via Po, 14 –10123 Turin, Italy 
e-mail: francesco.iani@unito.it 
e-mail: monica.bucciarelli@unito.it  
bSchool of Life Sciences, University of Hull, Hull, UK HU6 7RX;  
e-mail: g.mazzoni@hull.ac.uk 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
Francesco Ianì 
Università di Torino 
Dipartimento di Psicologia 
Via Po, 14  
10123 Turin, Italy 
e-mail: francesco.iani@unito.it  
tel: +39.011.6703038; fax:+39.011.8146231 
 The role of mental kinematic simulation in creating false memories 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
Our investigation focuses on memory for scenes depicted in photos. According to the mental 
model theory, the observation of a static scene depicted in a photo which portrays an actor near to 
perform an action can trigger a kinematic mental simulation of that action unfolding in time. The 
deriving prediction is that such kinematic mental model supports the creation of a false memory of 
the actor performing an advanced phase of the action. We test this prediction in three experiments 
in which participants are presented with static scenes of actions, and after three days they perform a 
recognition task in which they assess recognition of old and novel static scenes depicting actions. 
The results confirm that false memories occur for actions that represent the unfolding over time of 
the static action initially observed. Our theoretical framework can accommodate also several 
previous findings in the literature on false memories. 
 
Keywords: false memories, kinematic mental models, memory for actions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The role of mental kinematic simulation in creating false memories 
 
4 
 
Introduction 
Several studies in the literature highlight the role of suggestion in the formation of false 
memories. For example, false memories of self-performed actions can result from either imagining 
to perform an action (imagination-inflation effect, Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Goff 
& Roediger, 1998) or observing another individual while performing the action (observation-
inflation effect, Lindner, Echterhoff, Davidson, & Brand, 2010). Most recently, it has been found 
that also creating a mental image of another person performing an action (Lindner & Echterhoff, 
2015) as well as listening to the sound of someone performing actions (Lindner & Henkel, 2015) 
can trigger false memories of self-performance. 
Also self-produced actions or sequences of interrelated actions can yield to false memories. 
In a study by Henkel (2011) the participants performed a series of actions (phase 1), later on viewed 
a series of photos representing finished actions (phase 2), then performed a memory test (phase 3). 
The test detected false memories. For example, if the participants in phase 2 viewed a photo 
depicting a glass full of water and an empty bottle, in phase 3 they were likely to believe having 
performed in phase 1 an action that, although being necessary to complete the final scene 
represented in the photo, they did not actually perform (e.g., pouring out the water). Analogously, 
the participants in a study by Foster and Garry (2012), after a construction task in which they 
performed some steps of the task while other steps were performed by the experimenter (unseen by 
the participant), falsely remembered having completed the experimenter-performed steps.  
False memories can arise also from observation of movies or still frames of sequences of 
actions, as well. Gerrie, Belcher and Garry (2006) found that when the participants in their 
experiment saw a movie of a woman making a sandwich, and some actions were missing in the 
movie, in a subsequent memory test they falsely remembered 17% of unseen elements from the 
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event. It happens that seeing frames of sequences of actions depicting an effect but not a cause, can 
lead, in a recognition test, to mistake new cause scenes as old, i.e., to automatically draw backward 
inferences (Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001). Foster and Garry (2012) argue that these findings about the 
effects of seeing movies or sequences of actions can be explained by assuming that people use the 
relationship between items to internally generate the missing related information. However, the 
mental processes underlying the generation of the missing related information have been not 
investigated.  
Stemming from this literature, the aim of the present investigation is threefold. First, we 
explore the possibility that false memories arise not only from the observation of series of still 
frames (i.e., Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001), but also from the observation of a single still frame 
portraying an action (i.e., a single photo). Second, we assessed whether false memories can be 
obtained for actions that represent a “logical” and temporal continuation of the action that is seen in 
the still frame (future rather than past), even when performed by another individual. Third, we shed 
light on the cognitive mechanism underlying the creation of this kind of false memories. The 
assumptions of the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 2006) easily predict the occurrence 
of false memories in response to still frames portraying actions, as tested in this study, and explain 
the results on false memories for actions reported above. These aims were assessed in three 
experiments. 
 
Mental model theory, kinematic mental simulations and false memories 
Mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 2006) assumes that the deep comprehension of a 
state of affairs is tantamount to the construction of a mental model. A mental model is an iconic 
mental representation in which the elements and the relations among such elements stand, 
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respectively, for the entities in the state of affairs perceived or described and for the relations among 
these entities. Differently from a mental image, which is also an iconic mental representation, a 
mental model represents a set of states of affairs rather than a single state of affairs. Mental models 
can be either static or kinematic. A kinematic model unfolds in time, and the sequence of situations 
that it represents corresponds to the temporal order of events in the world, real or imaginary 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Schaeken, Johnson-Laird, & d’Ydewalle, 1996); the kinematic simulation is 
akin to a mental “movie” (Hegarty, 1992; Johnson-Laird, 1983). However, a kinematic model is not 
a holistic and dynamic mental image. Evidence of the difference between a kinematic mental 
simulations and a mental image comes from studies in which the task of the participants was to 
infer the behavior of a mechanical system made of three pulleys connected by a rod, and one above 
the other (so that by pulling the rod the pulleys rotate in different directions), from a visual-spatial 
representation (a static diagram) of that mechanical system. Experimental evidence suggests that the 
task relies on a mental animation process involving the decomposition of the representation of the 
pulley system into smaller units corresponding to the machine components, and animating these 
components in a sequence corresponding to the causal sequence of events in the machine's 
operation (see, for a review, Hegarty, 2004). Hegarty (1992) found that people, when told that the 
rod is pulled from the higher hand, take more time to infer the motion of the bottom pulley, than the 
middle pulley and more time to infer the movement of the middle pulley than the top pulley. She 
reasoned that people infer the motion of the components piecemeal, beginning by imagining the 
moving rope being pulled, and working through the causal chain of events in the motion of the 
system. This evidence that mechanical reasoning involves sequentially propagating the effects of 
local interactions between components is inconsistent with the assumption that the mental 
simulation consists in the inspection of a holistic and dynamic mental image of the moving 
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mechanism. If so, all the parts of the system would move together in the mental image and an 
inspection of such an image would allow fast responses about the movement of any part of the 
system. But it is not so. The mental simulation is based on a dynamic mental model, and not simply 
on a mental image. 
Mental model theory also dissociates inferential processes obtained through mental 
simulation from reasoning based on descriptive and propositional knowledge (like scripts or 
schemas). Provided the existence of separate buffers in working memory specialized for 
maintaining visuospatial representations and verbal representations (Baddeley, 2002), studies 
demonstrated that visuospatial working memory load interferes more than verbal working memory 
load with tasks involving kinematic mental simulation such as mechanical reasoning, and similarly, 
mechanical reasoning interferes more with the visuospatial than the verbal memory loading task 
(Sims & Hegarty, 1997).  
Within a mental model perspective, kinematic mental simulations are central in thinking and 
reasoning. Consistent with this, studies in the literature showed that individuals construct small-
scale simulations of possible interactions among parts when trying to understand mechanisms 
(Hegarty, 2004) as well as physical scenes (Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013), and they run 
kinematic mental simulations to deduce from algorithms and to abduce algorithms  (Bucciarelli, 
Mackiewicz, Khemlani, & Johnson-Laird, 2016; Khemlani, Mackiewicz, Bucciarelli, & Johnson-
Laird, 2013).  
The predictions derived from the mental model theory’s assumptions have been widely 
tested in the formal reasoning domain, as well as in the domain of discourse comprehension; they 
are mainly concerned with the valid inferences resulting from models’ construction and 
manipulation. We know from the literature on mental models that individuals who built an 
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articulated mental model from a discourse, compared to individuals who built a less articulated 
model, are more likely to draw correct, discourse-based inferences, and they are less likely to 
remember the surface form of that discourse (Cutica & Bucciarelli, 2008). In the present 
investigation we focus on the mental kinematic simulation that people make during the 
comprehension of a static situation depicted in a photo, rather than a discourse. The photo depicts 
an individual “near to perform” an action. Specifically, we investigate whether false memories can 
arise from such kinematic mental models constructed from the static action depicted in the photo 
(i.e., erroneously remembering of having seen the actor dynamically performing the action). We 
predict participants to remember having seen actions that were not presented, but that are part of the 
kinematic mental simulation stemming from the actions presented. Our argument is reinforced by 
neurocognitive studies on action observation. Several neurocognitive studies largely demonstrated 
that when people observe an action of other individuals, their motor system is automatically 
involved and activated (e.g., Buccino, Binkofski, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese et al., 2001). It has been 
argued that this motor recruitment allows the observer to immediately understand what other people 
are doing and to interpret another person’s action (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Most relevant, the 
observer’s motor system is selectively recruited also when the participants observe a still actor that 
potentially could act on an object that falls within his reaching space (Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia, & 
Costantini, 2012). The authors of these studies suggest that observed actions are matched to actions 
in the observer motor repertoire thus automatically allowing predictions about what others are going 
to do next. Other studies detected a crucial role of the contextual information in action 
understanding, given that the knowledge about an object placed in the peripersonal space of another 
person can trigger both action prediction and interpretation (see, e.g., Bach, Nicholson, & Hudson, 
2014).  
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Our argument is reinforced also by studies conducted within the representational momentum 
(RM) paradigm (see, e.g., Freyed & Finke, 1984), that differently from the literature on action 
observation emphasizes a main role of top-down rather than bottom-up processes in predicting an 
action’s future course. Typically, the participants in these studies see a moving object that suddenly 
disappears. Immediately after, they see the object displaced slightly either in a potential future 
position (forward in time) or in a previous position (backward in time). Experimental results reveal 
that when participants are asked to identify the last and seen position of the object, they tend to 
accept forward displacements. Most relevant to our investigation, the participants in the studies by 
Hudson and colleagues (2016a; 2016b) saw hands reach or withdraw from an object. When the 
participants, before seeing the movement, heard the actor declare the intention to either take or 
leave the object, they misperceived the hand’s disappearance point as being further along the action 
trajectory than it actually was (Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016a). The same results held 
when the participants themselves generated action expectations on the basis of the nature of the 
object (e.g., the hand will reach a glass, the hand will withdraw from a broken glass; Hudson, 
Nicholson, Simpson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016b). 
We assume that a kinematic mental simulation can give rise to a false memory which 
consists of a “logical” and temporal continuation of the situation depicted in a photo. Globally 
considered, the results in the neurocognitive and the RM literatures enforce the assumption that the 
state of affairs in which the actor is dynamically performing the action is the necessary consequence 
of the situation depicted in the original photo, in which the actor was near to perform the action. 
Mental model theory for false memories resulting from kinematic mental simulation explains false 
memories arising from the observation of frames of sequences of actions or movies obtained in 
previous work (e.g., Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001) as due to the kinematic mental simulation induced 
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by the sequences of frames or movies. With the exception of the studies conducted within the 
representational momentum paradigm, all previous studies employing visual material detected false 
memories resulting from backward inferences, namely inferring a cause (i.e., a person hitting the 
oranges, or the actions leading to the final LEGO vehicle) from an observed effect (e.g., oranges on 
the floor, or a built LEGO vehicle; Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001, and Foster & Garry 2012, 
respectively). In these studies, in addition, the nature of the backward inference was not clear. 
Inferring the cause from an effect could also be based on logical/verbal backward inferences. 
Within the framework proposed in the present study, a false memory about an action can arise from 
a specific mental simulation, i.e. a mental movie rewinding or unfolding in time, and that should 
then produce both backward and forward inferences, respectively. 
Ours is the first attempt to show that false memories for actions from purely visual scenes 
can be obtained for future events (e.g., effects stemming from a cause), and not just for causes or 
missing middle pieces of actions, as previously shown. Previous work showing false memories for 
future events used verbal material (Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973) also accompanied by 
photos (Henkel, 2012). In our case only visual material (still frames of actions) is presented. From 
our viewpoint, also the studies conducted on action observation (e.g., Hudson et al., 2016a) induced 
a kinematic mental simulation by declaring or by having participants declare the goal of the actor 
before the action is observed. Also, since the construction of a kinematic mental model corresponds 
to a deep processing of the information in the scenario, we predicted that its product, namely a false 
memory, can still occur after days. The focus on memory for single static situations, using 
exclusively visual material, testing an effect on false memories detectable after a time interval of 
days rather than seconds, assessing the possibility that these false memories occur for future states 
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(e.g., consequences) and not past states (e.g., causes), are the main elements of novelty of our 
investigation. 
 
An Investigation on False Memories from Kinematic Mental Simulation 
In our experiments the participants saw a series of photos in which an actor is near to 
perform an action on an object (for example, is reaching for a bottle). In both Experiments 1 and 2, 
three days later they performed a recognition task in which they encountered, along with all original 
photos, three new photos depicting the same actor and the same object (see Figure 1). We explain in 
some detail the material as this is necessary to describe the experiments. One of the three photos 
represents a situation that should be part of the mental simulation of the original action (in the 
example above, the actor while performing the action, i.e., drinking from the bottle), and thus could 
result from a kinematic mental simulation from the photo (for this reason we shall refer to such 
photo – and action   as ‘forward’. For example, in Figure 1, if the presented photo is A1, the 
‘forward’ photo is A2). The other two photos depict the same actor near to perform and while 
performing a different action on the same object, exactly in the same environment (e.g., picking up 
the bottle to pour the water; pouring the water in a glass). We shall refer to these photos as ‘other1’ 
(B1 in Figure 1) and ‘other2’ (B2 in Figure 1), respectively.  To be noticed that the situation 
depicted in ‘other2’ should also be part of a mental scenario, but this time should be part of the 
mental scenario created on the basis of the action depicted in ‘other1’. Thus it should correspond to 
the situation/action resulting from the kinematic mental simulation stemming from ‘other1’. The 
pairs ‘original’-‘forward’, and ‘other1’-‘other2’ pertain each to a specific kinematic pattern that 
features the motion of an agent with a specific intention. Thus, presenting ‘original’ or ‘other1’ 
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results in two different simulations and therefore in two different inferences: specifically, ‘forward’ 
and ‘other2’, respectively. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
For the way they were created, these photos should differ in perceptual similarity. For 
example, assuming that in Figure 1 the ‘original’ is A1, the photo in which the actor is near to pour 
from the bottle (photo B1 in Figure 1, in general ‘other1’) is the most similar to the original photo 
of holding the bottle to drink (A1), and because of the high level of perceptual similarity should be 
the most likely false recognition. The photo depicting the actor while accomplishing the action 
different from the original one (B2 in Figure 1, in general ‘other2’) should be the most dissimilar 
from the original and thus the least likely to be falsely recognized. The critical photo, and the most 
interesting for our prediction, is the ‘forward’ one (A2 in Figure 1) depicting the actor while 
performing the action that the actor was near to perform in the original photo (A1). As B2’, this 
photo is also perceptually different from the original, and based on perceptual similarity also 
unlikely to be falsely recognized. However, we predict that it will be falsely recognized because it is 
part of the kinematic mental simulation that stems from the original photo (A1).  
Within our proposed theoretical framework, kinematic false memories (‘forward’) and other 
kinds of memory (‘original’, ‘other1’ and ‘other2’) rely on different cognitive mechanisms: the 
former rely on a mental simulation and the latter on perceptual processes. From these assumptions 
descend three main predictions.  
The first prediction, tested in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, concerns a trend in 
acceptance ratings for ‘original’ photo and distractors. In particular, if recognition relies only on 
perceptual processes, then ‘other1’ photo should be misrecognized more often than ‘forward’ photo, 
which in turn should be misrecognized more often than ‘other2’  photo. If instead the participants 
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rely also on kinematic mental simulations, then ‘forward’ photo should be misrecognize to the same 
extent as ‘other1’ photo, and more than ‘other2’ photo.  
The second prediction, also tested in both Experiments 1 and 2, is that ‘forward’ photo is 
more likely than ‘other1’ photo to be rated with extreme ratings on a five-point Likert scale (i.e., 1 
= ‘I certainly didn’t see the photo’; 5 = ‘I certainly saw the photo’), and ‘other1’ photo is more 
likely than ‘forward’ photo to be rated with uncertainty (i.e., 2, 3, or 4). The rationale is the 
following. Given that ‘forward’ photo represents the exact result of the kinematic mental simulation 
triggered by the ‘original’ photo, we predict that when the participants’ response relies on this 
simulation, the recognition of ‘forward’ photo should be certain (i.e., 5). Otherwise, if they do not 
use mental simulations, confidence in recognition should be at floor level (i.e., 1). Instead, ‘other 1’ 
photo is very similar to the ‘original’ photo but at the same time it doesn’t fully fit with it. Then 
recognition of ‘other1’ should always be rather uncertain (i.e., 2, 3, 4). To sum up, ‘other1’ photo is 
more likely than ‘forward’ photo to be rated with uncertainty (i.e., 2, 3, or 4) and ‘forward’ photo is 
more likely than ‘other1’ photo to be rated with certainty (i.e., 1 or 5). 
The third prediction is tested in Experiment 2 and concerns the ineffectiveness of 
information on the nature of the stimuli received by participants. The main assumption underlying 
our investigation is that the observation of an actor near to perform an action elicits in the observer 
a kinematic simulation in which the action unfolds in time and represents the agent while 
performing that action. To make a kinematic mental simulation is to imagine a step-by-step 
developing action that maintains vivid perceptual elements (static and kinematic) of the original. 
Studies revealed that at least in some circumstances, imagery recruits the same mechanisms used in 
the early phases of perceptual processing (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). As a consequence, 
imagery makes explicit and accessible the same types of information that are registered by the 
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senses during perception (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009). This should hold also for kinematic mental 
simulations. Therefore from our assumption and from evidence in the literature, we derive the 
prediction that the kinematic mental simulation is sufficiently vivid and percept-like to trick the 
monitoring system (Johnson, Hastroudy & Lindsay, 1973) even when instructions given at 
recognition  make explicit the nature of the material used (i.e. participants are informed that the 
recognition material comprises pairs of photos, not all presented, each pair selected as portraying 
two steps of an unfolding action on the same object). In other words, we should observe no specific 
reduction in  false memories deriving from kinematic mental simulations because of the vividness 
of the  perceptual static and kinematic details of the mental simulation which are similar to those 
involved in recalling true memories.    
We ran a first study, preliminary to the experiments proper, aimed at confirming the levels 
of perceptual similarities between the original photo and the other photos. The investigation was 
approved by the Bioethical Committee of Hull University and by the Bioethical Committee of Turin 
University. 
 
Preliminary study. Perceptual similarity of the stimuli 
The aim of the study was to assess the perceptual similarity of experimental stimuli that 
were then to be used in Experiments 1 and 2. Specifically we assessed the level of perceptual 
similarity between the original photo and the three distractor photos presented for recognition.  
Method 
Participants. Twenty students from Turin University (6 males and 14 females; mean age = 
23.3 years) voluntarily took part in the experiment in exchange of course credits and after informed 
consent. 
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Material. For this initial study, as in part already described in the introduction, series of 
pairs of videos were first created in which the same actor performed two different actions on the 
same object in the very same environmental setting. For each video, we set the onset of the action at 
the moment in which the actor starts to move and the end at the moment in which the action is 
completed. For each video two still frames were extracted. In one the actor is near to perform the 
action (‘original’ photo, see Figure 1; e.g., A1 she is reaching for the bottle). This still frame was 
taken at 2/3 of the entire video’s length. In the other the actor is performing the action (‘forward’ 
photo, e.g., A2, she is drinking from the bottle; ‘other2’, e.g., B2, in which the actor has completed 
a different action ‘other1’, e.g., B1). In both videos the actor was instructed to enter the scene in the 
same way when performing the two actions. The four still frames in which the same object was 
used were grouped together, resulting in 10 sets of 4 photos each, each set composed of an 
‘original’ photo, a ‘forward’ photo, an ‘other1’ photo and an ‘other2’ photo.  The Appendix 
illustrates the 10 quadruplets of photos.  
Design and Procedure.  Either A1 or B1 of each quadruplet were used as the ‘original’ 
photo. For half of the participants the ‘original’ photos were A1 photos in the quadruplets from 1 to 
5 in the Appendix, and B1 photos in the quadruplets from 6 to 10. For the other half of participants, 
the ‘original’ photos were B1 in the quadruplets from 1 to 5 in the Appendix, and the photos A1 in 
the quadruplets from 6 to 10. The experiment was run in a single session. 
The participants were invited to imagine themselves in a critical situation: “You are at a 
friend’s house in front of a fireplace and you are looking at several photographs. At a certain point 
your friend exits the room and you, inadvertently, drop one of the photographs in the fireplace. You 
can not in any way recover the original photo now compromised. The only possible solution is to 
replace it with another one as similar as possible. In the following pages you will observe the 
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original photograph and three possible alternatives. We ask you to assign a score from 1 to 3 to each 
of the alternatives, assigning 1 to the photo that would be your first choice and 3 to your last choice. 
In other words you should answer to the following question: “Which picture would you use to 
replace the original one?”.  These instructions were meant to focus the participants on perceptual 
similarity rather than “psychological similarity”. We suspected that the explicit instruction to assess 
the similarity of the stimuli could have lead the participants to substitute the forward photo for the 
“lost” original one because they anticipated that the owner might confuse it with the original one.  
Because of the equidistance between the three ratings, the ordinal data obtained were used to 
measure perceptual distance.  
Results and discussion 
Figure 2 illustrates the ratings of perceptual similarity. A non-parametric analysis of 
variance detected a statistically significant difference in the ratings given to the 3 kinds of photos 
(‘forward’, ‘other1’, ‘other2’) (χ2 (2) = 31.92, p < .0001, Kendall’s W = .80). At the post hoc 
analysis with Wilcoxon tests (the Bonferroni correction resulted in a significance level set at p < 
.017), the participants judged the ‘other1’ photos as perceptually more similar to the ‘original’ than 
‘forward’ photos (a mean of 1.40, sd = .22 versus a mean of 1.97, sd = .31, respectively; z = 3.43, p 
< .001, Cliff’s δ = .88). Also, the participants judged ‘forward’ photos as more similar to the 
‘original’ compared to ‘other2’ photos (a mean of 1.97, sd = .31 and a mean of 2.64, sd = .21, 
respectively; z = 3.78, p < .0001, Cliff’s δ = .94) and, obviously, ‘other1’ photos as more similar to 
the ‘original’ compared to ‘other2’ photos (a mean of 1.40, sd = .22 and a mean of 2.64, sd =.21, 
respectively;  z = 3.93, p < .0001, Cliff’s δ = .1).  
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Globally considered, the results of the preliminary study confirm that the 3 distractor photos 
in the quadruplet differ from the ‘original’ and among themselves in perceptual similarity, and that 
the ‘forward’ photo is more perceptually dissimilar from the original than the ‘other1’ photo.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Experiment 1: False memories for action in recognition as predicted by 
kinematic mental simulation 
The participants in the experiment were invited to observe the same series of ‘original’ 
photos used in the preliminary study (A1 or B1 photos). In particular, since our aim was to test the 
prediction that false memories for future events can stem from kinematic mental simulations (and 
not to ascertain that people spontaneously create a kinematic simulation of the action), we 
instructed the participants to understand what was happening in the situation depicted in each photo 
they observed. Participants’ memory for the photos was tested in a recognition task 3 days later. At 
recognition the participants were presented, along with the ‘original’, the photos ‘forward’, ‘other1’ 
and ‘other2’. Based on the results of the preliminary study, we predicted that participants would 
make false recognitions to ‘other1’ photos because of their perceptual similarity. However, if when 
seeing a still frame of an ongoing action kinematic mental models are created, then false 
recognitions would be more likely with ‘forward’ photos compared to ‘other2’ photos. Within a 
mental model framework, only ‘forward’ photos depict the continuation of the action represented in 
the ‘original’ photo and the kinematic mental simulation that occurs when being exposed to the still 
action would make it difficult to clearly identify which part of the action was presented and which 
part was not. Our experiment is open to falsification of the hypothesis: if the participants do not 
make a kinematic simulation then only perceptual similarity should predict the likelihood to 
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misrecognize the distractors (misrecognition: ‘other1’> ‘forward’> ‘other2’). Also, based on the 
assumption that false recognition of ‘other1’ photo is based on perceptual processes and false 
recognition of ‘forward’ photo is based on a kinematic mental simulation, we predicted that 
uncertain ratings are more frequent for ‘other1’ compared to ‘forward’ photos, while extreme 
ratings that indicate certainty are more frequent for ‘forward’ compared to ‘other1’ photos. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-six Hull University students (24 females, 2 males; mean age 21.6 
years) voluntarily took part in the experiment, after informed consent, in exchange of either 1 hour 
credit or 8£. 
Design and Procedure. The experiment consisted of two phases: in the first phase the 
participants encountered the same 10 quadruplets of photos as in the preliminary study, and in the 
second phase, three days later, they had a recognition test. In the observation phase each participant 
saw 20 photos, of which 10 critical ‘original’ photos depicting actions near to be performed (A1 or 
B1) and 10 non-critical photos (fillers) depicting a second set of completed actions (A2 and B2 
from the filler set). Completed filler actions were presented to prevent participants from realizing 
that the original photos were always depicting action onsets. Using a block experimental design, the 
ten critical actions were divided in two blocks, with 5 actions each. Half participants observed 
‘original’ photos in the first block and ‘other1’ photos in the second block. Blocks were presented 
in the opposite order to the other half. Within each block, photos were presented in random order. 
Participants were instructed as follows: “In this phase we will show you several photos. Your task is 
to carefully observe each photo and try to understand what is happening in the depicted situation 
without stating it out loud. Each photo is presented for 5 seconds then a black screen appears, with 
the sentence “press the space bar when you are ready”. This means that when you have understood 
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what is happening in the situation depicted, you can press the space bar and the procedure moves to 
the next photo. If you don’t press the bar, after 10 seconds the next photo will be automatically 
presented.”  We introduced a black screen after each photo, thereby providing enough time to run a 
complete mental simulation.  
In the recognition phase, strictly 3 days after the presentation phase, the participants saw 50 
photos. For each critical action they saw the relative quadruplet of photos (‘original’, ‘forward’, 
‘other1’ and ‘other2’) for a total of 40 photos. In addition they saw 5 presented fillers (all A2) and 5 
new initial action photos of the other 5 presented fillers (A1 instead of A2). The 50 photos were 
presented in a random order, with the only constraint being that those belonging to the same 
quadruplet did not occur on two consecutive trials. Participants were asked to give recognition 
ratings on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (“I certainly didn’t see this photo”) to 5 (“I certainly did 
see this photo”), see Roediger & McDermott (1995) for a similar recognition task.  
Results and discussion 
At the Shapiro-Wilk test the recognition ratings of the correct photos did significantly differ 
from the normal distribution (S-W test: df(26),  w = .907,  p = .023). Statistical analyses were thus 
performed using nonparametric statistical tests. A preliminary analysis excluded a gender effect. 
Females did not differ from males for true memories (mean rating 3.9, sd = 0.5 and mean rating 4.3, 
sd = 0.9, respectively: Mann-Whitney test: z = .58, p = .56). Also, females did not differ from males 
for false memories (mean rating 2.5, sd = 0.6 and mean rating 2.6, sd = 0.6, respectively: Mann-
Whitney test: z = .15, p = .89). The data from females and males were then analyzed together. 
Figure 3 illustrates the ratings assigned by the participants in the recognition test. Ratings 
were statistically different across kinds of photos (χ2 (3) = 52.25, p < .0001, Kendall’s W = .67). As 
predicted, at the post hoc analysis (Wilcoxon tests -the Bonferroni correction resulted in a 
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significance level set at p < .008), the participants judged the ‘original’ photo (a mean of 3.96, sd = 
.55) more familiar than each of the other distractors (z value varied from 4.33 to 4.46, p value 
always < .0001, Cliff’s δ always > .89). There was also a significant difference between the 
recognition ratings given to ‘forward’ photos (a mean of 2.47, sd = .55) and ‘other2’ photos (a mean 
of 1.85, sd = .50; z = 3.59, p < .0001, Cliff’s δ = .57). The same result holds for the comparison 
between ‘other1’ (a mean of 2.67, sd = .53) and ‘other2’ (z = 4.26, p < .0001, Cliff’s δ = .73). 
However, the difference between ‘forward’ and ‘other1’ was not significant (z = 1.25, p = .21). 
Since the null effect between ‘forward’ and ‘other1’ was critical to our prediction, we 
performed a Bayes Factor (BF) analysis (see Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) in 
order to determine the ratio of evidence in favor of the null hypothesis and of the alternative 
hypothesis for our pair-wise comparison of interest. Specifically, we compared the ratings given at 
‘forward’ and ‘other1’ testing the H0 (no differences between the two ratings) and the H1 (greater 
confidence ratings for ‘other1’ as follows from our preliminary study) using Bayesian t-test. We 
obtained a BF01 of 1.30 for the difference between these two ratings. This suggests that the data 
actually provide more support for the null hypothesis, being 1.30 times more likely to occur under 
the null hypothesis, compared to the alternative hypothesis (see, Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Our assumptions that ratings given to ‘other1’ photos depend mostly on perceptual 
similarity whereas ratings given to ‘forward’ photos arise from the mental kinematic simulation 
imply the prediction that participants should be more likely to give uncertain ratings to ‘other1’ 
photo whereas they should be more extreme in rating ‘forward’ photos. We assessed this prediction 
by splitting the ratings into extreme (ratings of 1 or 5), and uncertain (ratings of 2,3,4) (see Table 1). 
The analysis of the two ratings confirmed the predictions: extreme ratings (1, 5) were more often 
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assigned to ‘forward’ photos than to ‘other1’ photos, and uncertain ratings (2, 3, 4) were more often 
assigned to ‘other1’ photos than to ‘forward’ photos (Wilcoxon test: z = 2.86, p < .004, Cliff’s δ = 
.31, for both comparisons).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Globally considered, the results of Experiment 1 reveal that participants were most confident 
they had not seen 'other2' photos compared to ‘forward’ photos, and their confidence in recognition 
for ‘forward’ photos and ‘other1’ photos was not significantly different, although according to the 
results of the preliminary study ‘forward’ photo is perceptually more different from the original 
than ‘other1’ photo. If the participants were guided in their recognition memory task by perceptual 
similarity only, then they should have misrecognized ‘forward’ photo less than ‘other1’ photo. 
Hence, while ‘other1’ photo might be misrecognized because of perceptual similarity with the 
‘original’ photo, ‘forward’ photo is misrecognized because it depicts a situation consistent with the 
natural continuation of the action depicted in the ‘original’ photo as a result of the kinematic mental 
simulation. Our assumption on the different cognitive processes underlying misrecognition of 
‘other1’ photo and ‘forward’ photo is further enforced by the results of the analysis of their relative 
extreme and uncertain ratings. The more frequent extreme ratings for ‘forward’ photo compared to 
‘other1’ photo enforces our assumption that performing a kinematic mental simulation during the 
observation phase makes the observer certain of having seen the ‘forward’ photo (the only one that  
logically and temporally represents a development of the situation depicted in the ‘original’ photo) 
whereas having not performed the simulation makes the observer certain having not seen the 
‘forward’ photo. The more frequent uncertain ratings for ‘other1’ compared to ‘forward’ photo 
enforces our assumption that the observer is uncertain of having seen ‘other1’ photo, which is 
perceptually the most similar to ‘original’ photo. 
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Experiment 2: Instructions on nature of the stimuli do not reduce forward false 
memories for actions 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to test whether the kinematic mental simulation is sufficiently 
percept-like to trick the monitoring system (Johnson, Hastroudy & Lindsay, 1973). The assumption 
is that to make a kinematic mental simulation is a tantamount to imagine a step-by-step developing 
action that maintains vivid perceptual elements (static and kinematic). Therefore, we predict that the 
memory effects of such simulation cannot be easily monitored even when participants are warned 
about the nature of the material used (i.e. when participants are informed that the recognition 
material comprises pairs of photos, not all presented, each pair selected as portraying two steps of 
an unfolding action on the same object). In other words, instructions on nature of the stimuli should 
not lead to a specific reduction in false memories deriving from kinematic mental simulations 
(forward false memories) because of the vividness of the perceptual static and kinematic details of 
the mental simulation which are similar to those involved in recalling true memories. In particular, 
the instructions were meant to stress the nature of each quadruplet of photos: two photos depict the 
actor at different timings of execution of a certain action, and two photos depict the actor at 
different timings of execution of a different action.  
Thus, we predicted a replication of the results obtained in Experiment 1. First, false 
recognitions would be more likely with ‘forward’ photos compared to ‘other2’ photos. Second, 
uncertain ratings would be greater for ‘other1’ compared to ‘forward’ photos and extreme ratings 
would be greater for ‘forward’ compared to ‘other1’ photos. 
Method 
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Participants. Twenty-six Hull university students (14 females, 12 males; mean age 21.6 
years) voluntarily took part in the experiment. All of them received either 1 hour credit or 8£. 
Design and Procedure.  The design and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1, but 
the instruction at recognition were different: “Please note that during this second part of the 
experiment, for each photo that you have seen in the first phase, in addition to the original one, 
three other photos will be presented as well, and in a random order. Therefore for each scenario 
(e.g., tying a shoe), you will observe overall 4 photos, which are very similar to each other. 
Specifically, two of the photos are extracted from a video where an actor performs an action on an 
object (e.g., tying the shoe), while the other two photos are extracted from another video where the 
same actor performs a different action on the same object (e.g., taking off the shoe). During the first 
phase you saw only one of these four photos”.  
Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test determined that the recognition ratings did not significantly differ 
from the normal distribution (S-W test: df(26), w varied from .93 to .97, p varied from < .06 to < 
.63). Statistical analyses were thus performed using parametric statistical tests. A preliminary 
analysis excluded a gender effect on either true memories or false memories. Females did not differ 
from males for true memories (mean rating 3.9, sd = 0.7 and mean rating 3.7, sd = 0.7, respectively: 
Mann-Whitney test: z = .65, p = .52), nor for false memories (mean rating 2.6, sd = 0.6 and mean 
rating 2.6, sd = 0.5, respectively: Mann-Whitney test: z = .258, p = .80). The data from females and 
males were then analyzed together. 
Figure 4 illustrates recognition ratings. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
difference in mean ratings across the different kinds of photos (F(1.96,49.09) = 35.35, p = <.0001, 
ηp2 = .59). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that, as predicted, the participants 
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were more confident in their recognition of the ‘original’ photo (a mean of 3.79, sd = .68) than each 
of the distractors (p value always < .0001, Cohen’s d always > 1.34). Further, as predicted, ratings 
given to ‘forward’ were significantly higher than those to ‘other2’ photos (a mean of 2.58, sd = .54 
and a mean of 2.20, sd = .69, respectively: p <.04, Cohen’s d = .59). Also, as in Experiment 2 there 
was no significant difference in ratings between ‘other1’ (a mean of 2.54, sd = .55) and ‘forward’ (p 
= 1). In this experiment, there was no significant difference between ‘other1’ and ‘other2’ (p = .07).  
As in Experiment 1, we determined the ratio of evidence in favor of the null hypothesis and 
of the alternative hypotheses for our pair-wise comparisons of interest, namely acceptance ratings of 
‘other1’ compared to ‘forward’. We ran a paired t test between the two ratings by employing the 
Bayes Factor approach, and we obtained a BF01 of 6.04 for the difference between ‘other1’ and 
‘forward’. This suggests that the data actually provide more support for the null hypothesis (no 
differences between the two ratings), being 6.04 times more likely to occur under the null 
hypothesis, compared to the alternative hypothesis (greater confidence ratings for ‘other1’ as 
follows from our preliminary study). 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
Furthermore, the results for Experiment 2 revealed that extreme ratings (1, 5) were more 
often assigned to ‘forward’ photos than to ‘other1’ photos and uncertain ratings (2, 3, 4) were more 
often assigned to ‘other1’ photos than to ‘forward’ photos (Wilcoxon test: z = 2.28, p < .03, Cliff’s 
δ = .34, for both comparisons).  
Insert Table 2 about here 
  This experiment confirms the results of Experiment 1, showing that unseen photos depicting 
the completion of an action are confidently misrecognized as the original photos portraying actions 
near to completion. Misrecognitions are not different from those for photos that are perceptually 
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similar to the original. The results also show that these memory errors are not affected by 
information about the nature of the stimuli and the fact that they had seen only one of the four 
photos.   
 
General Discussion 
 We assumed that individuals try to make sense of what they observe in a photograph in 
which actors handle objects by running a kinematic mental simulation of the situation, namely by 
constructing a dynamic mental model that unfolds in time in the same temporal order of the 
sequence of events. From the assumption that individuals perform a kinematic mental simulation 
from the information observed, we derived the predictions that false memories for the continuation 
or the conclusion of an action may occur also when participants see a single photo portraying an 
action’s onset. Differently from previous work on false memories from visual material (Foster & 
Garry, 2012; Hanning & Reinitz, 2001) the memory errors that are predicted concern future rather 
than past states of affairs.  
 In Experiment 1 we confirmed these predictions. Participants confidently misrecognized 
photos that were not presented but that portrayed the potential conclusion of the action that was 
represented in the photos they saw.  Participants saw photos in which a dynamic action on an object 
was at 2/3 towards conclusion (e.g., holding a bottle to drink from it-original photo), and 
misrecognized the completed actions (forward photo) as presented. These error rates were not 
dissimilar to those made for photos that portrayed a very similar action to the original one 
(‘other1’), also taken at 2/3 towards conclusion (e.g., holding a bottle to pour from it). These 
‘other1’ photos were evaluated by participants in a preliminary study as perceptually more similar 
to the originals than the forward photos. The results of Experiment 1 revealed that the level of 
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perceptual similarity with the original (as detected in the preliminary study) is not the only factor 
affecting misrecognition. The kinematic mental simulation from the original photo leads to a 
substantial level of misrecognition of the ‘forward’ photo, and to a level not significantly different 
than ‘other1’ photos, which are perceptually more similar to the ‘original’ compared to ‘forward’. 
In Experiment 2 we assessed whether informing the participants, before the recognition task, 
about the nature of the ‘original’ photos and the distracters would help the monitoring system reject 
false memories. Results indicated the ineffectiveness of information on the nature of the stimuli. In 
line with our assumption that kinematic mental simulation is vivid and percept-like, we observed 
forward false memories even when instructions given at recognition made explicit the nature of the 
material used. In sum, the vivid static and dynamic details resulting from the kinematic mental 
simulation run at encoding trick the monitoring system at retrieval. In relation to the results of 
Experiment 1, those of Experiment 2 seem to suggest that accuracy decreases overall. It is possible 
that information provided by the instructions to the participants in Experiment 2, which make 
explicit the potential confusion due to the nature of the stimuli, resulted in a decrease of the overall 
level of confidence.  
The global results of the two experiments evidence the existence of kinematic false 
memories from still frames of actions; a skeptic might argue that the participants in our experiments 
did not accept ‘forward’ photos with similar confidence to ‘original’ photos and that, therefore, we 
are not entitled to consider memories of this kind as false. However, lower confidence for false 
memories are not unique to our study. In the literature which inspired our investigation, false 
memories are characterized by lower confidence than the original items. Confidence ratings  in our 
study were assessed with the same 5-point confidence rating scale adopted by Hannigan and Reinitz 
(2001), who were among the first authors to investigate false memories from still frames (of 
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sequences of actions). Within the theoretical framework they initiated, false memories were 
accepted with a mean confidence rating of about 2, which is lower than confidence for true 
memories (mean confidence rating of about 4). In other words, these authors consider to be false 
also memories perceived with lower confidence than true memories.  
Which mechanisms then might be responsible for creating false memories for actions? 
In the thirties of the last century, Bartlett (1932) discovered that the participants in his study 
remembered the events read in a story quite differently from the way they were described in the 
story itself, and introduced the notion of schema in order to explain the phenomenon. More 
recently, studies on recognition memory analyzed the effects of scripts on accepting information 
that is typical but false. For example, the participants in a study by Garcia-Bajos and Migueles 
(2003) listened to a brief account of a mugging event and at recognition they misrecognized non-
presented high typicality sentences such as “The victim is walking down the street”. Similar results 
were obtained by Yamada and Itsukushima (2013) with visual material: the participants in their 
study watched consecutive slides describing a man in a kitchen. At recognition, when they 
encountered verbal descriptions of the slides, they misrecognized non-presented but schema-
consistent actions , such as “Breaking eggs”. The misrecognition of ‘forward’ photos in our 
experiments cannot be accounted for within a script framework. A script account would predict 
comparable acceptance ratings for ‘forward’ and ‘other2’ as they belong to the same script. The 
rationale is that the two actions in each quadruplet of photos involve the same actor interacting with 
the same object in the same environment, and both actions are plausible in that environment. If 
responses relied on scripts only, then one would observe comparable acceptance ratings for 
‘forward’ and ‘other2’. For example, a context in which a person is seating in front of a bottle of 
water and is reaching it, is compatible both with the script “drinking from a bottle” and “pouring 
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from a bottle”. Instead, we predict a specific role of the mental kinematic simulation, which is a 
model that unfolds in time a very specific action, and represents the sequence of situations that 
corresponds to the temporal order of events in the world, real or imaginary (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Schaeken et al., 1996). Several studies suggest that the kinematic features of a specific action are 
predictive of its end and goal (see, Castiello, 2005). Consistently with this, studies also revealed that 
the kinematics of a single action depends on the actor's intention: different intentions result in 
different kinematic patterns (e.g., Sartori, Becchio, Bara, & Castiello, 2009). Hence, the ‘forward’ 
photo is the necessary consequence of the situation depicted in the ‘original’ photo.. 
Prior studies in the literature with findings similar to ours outlined how false recognition can 
occur as a result of inferences that lead to source monitoring errors. Our proposal is consistent with 
a source monitoring interpretation (see, e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Whereas 
classical false memories can be attributed to a confusion of the image perceived with an image 
internally generated, kinematic false memories can be attributed to a confusion of the image 
perceived with the image resulting from a kinematic simulation of the image perceived. Our results 
enrich the source monitoring framework with a broader definition of mental representations that 
include both static and kinematic mental imagery.  
As far as we know, false memories for future events have been formerly investigated only 
from verbal material (Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973) and for verbal material accompanied 
by photos (Henkel, 2012). We explored forward false memories for actions portrayed in photos, but 
our assumptions hold also for a kinematic mental model constructed from verbal material. The 
participants in the experiment by Johnson et al. (1973) heard short stories of few sentence like, for 
example, ‘The farmers must be warned of the oncoming flood, the sheriff cried. He mounted as 
quickly as possible since he knew that it would take quite a while to spread all the news’. This was 
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followed by  a recognition test with  old sentences identical to those in the stories presented, 
unrelated sentences involving elements from the original stories but inconsistent with the 
information conveyed by the stories, and inference sentences, not identical to the presented 
sentences but potentially true by implication. For the story in the example above, the inference 
sentence was ‘The sheriff mounted his horse as quickly as possible since he knew that it would take 
quite a while to spread all the news’. The results of the experiment revealed that the participants 
misrecognized probable consequences of the action described in the original story. The participants 
in the studies by Henkel (2012) read short stories designed to induce inferences about their 
conclusions. For example, they read “Sabrina dropped the delicate vase”, that leads to infer that the 
vase broke. Each story was accompanied by a photo depicting either the likely conclusion (the 
broken vase), a detail of the story but not the conclusion (the vase before it was dropped), or no 
photo. A main result of the study was that seeing photos consistent with the inferred conclusions led 
the participants to falsely claim having read those conclusions. Within our terminology, the 
participants in these studies run a kinematic mental simulation of the information in each story (i.e., 
description of a dynamic action), thus inferring a conclusion about the consequence of the action, 
that later on they misrecognize as the original information. Henkel (2012) used in her experiments 
both verbal and visual material. However, differently from what we did in our experiments, the 
visual information in Henkel’s experiments were provided not as a trigger for the mental 
simulation, but as a way to enforce the inferences drawn by discourse. Differently from her work, 
we elicited in our participants a forward simulation by inviting them to try to understand what was 
happening in each photo, whereas Henkel (2012) elicited in the participants to her study a forward 
simulation by presenting at encoding, along with each story, a photo depicting the natural 
conclusion.  
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Globally considered, our results suggest that the mental kinematic simulations can easily 
lead to false memories. While the construction of a mental kinematic simulation has been found so 
far to be associated to correct performances (see, e.g., Bucciarelli et al.,  2016), this is the first 
demonstration that it can also lead to mistakes. This is similar to memory errors produced by levels 
of processing procedures. Kronlund and Whittlesea (2005) modified the standard levels-of-
processing procedure by presenting items either once or twice in the study phase. Each item was 
presented with either a semantic, phonemic or graphemic question. The task of the participants in 
the test phase was to judge the frequency with which each word had occurred in the study phase. 
The results reveal that deeper processing at encoding resulted in more accurate judgments of twice-
presented items, but also caused an illusion of repetition for items presented only once. As in other 
procedures that create false memories (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005), our findings indicate that a 
deep level of processing and understanding of a given material (i.e., understanding what is 
happening in the photo) can paradoxically produce false memories. 
Before drawing strong conclusions, one should also consider limitations of our investigation. 
A main limitation is not having tested the predictions deriving from the assumption that kinematic 
mental simulations are run at encoding, and not at retrieval. The role of encoding could be tested by 
replicating our experiments and adding a measure of response times during encoding. In our 
experiments presentation time was fixed, 5 seconds for each photo after which a black screen 
appeared. Participants had to press the space bar only at this point, in order to move to the next 
photo. During this time we assume they constructed the mental simulation from the photo observed. 
Using response times we could assess the relationship between time spent before moving to the next 
photo and likelihood of misrecognizing the ‘forward’ (and ‘other1’) photo as the ‘original’. A 
positive relationship would indicate that what happens during encoding predicts misrecognition of 
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‘forward’ but not of ‘other1’. In addition, still with the aim to ascertain whether mental simulations 
are run at encoding, a meta-cognitive experiment partially similar to our Experiment 2 could 
compare the performance of the participants in two conditions. In one condition before the encoding 
phase participants receive instructions to monitor the source, while in the other condition the 
instructions are given after the encoding phase. If the kinematic mental simulation is run at 
encoding, then false memories should be significantly less frequent when participants are informed 
prior to encoding. A further limit of our investigation concerns its generalizability. In the context of 
forensic research, for example, it is rather unlikely that witnesses are invited to recall what they 
previously saw in photos.  It is more likely that witnesses are invited to recall what a moving agent 
was doing in a particular situation. For this reason, future research could explore kinematic false 
memories from videos depicting a moving agent.  
The ecological validity of our study can be assessed by comparing our experimental task 
with what classically happens in eyewitness contexts.  While at recall the task is very similar to the 
typical task of an eyewitness, a major difference is that the participants in our experiments were 
invited to make sense of what they observed at encoding. Future studies might verify whether 
kinematic false memories occur when the participants are not instructed to make sense of the photos 
or the videos they observe, and when encoding is incidental rather than intentional. 
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